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Research Paper no. 10/07 
 
THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT REGIMES 
ON SELF EMPLOYED ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  
AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS  
 
Abstract
 
 
 
The importance of IPR regimes for large firm innovation is well documented but less is 
known about their impact on self-employed entrepreneurship which is typically less 
innovative.  The paper sets out to estimate the net effect of the various elements that 
comprise an IPR regime including the political system, the laws, and institutions as well 
as a general familiarity with and respect for IPR related products.  Cumulatively, the 
analysis indicates that a well developed IPR regime has a net positive effect on the self-
employment activity.  Since the self-employed sector is possibly the only segment of the 
enterprise base where IPRs may be expected to have a negative effect it provides a useful 
contribution to our empirical understanding of the welfare effects of IPRs on the 
entrepreneurial economy and economic development more widely. 
 
Contrary to some of the most vocal objections to the TRIPS Agreement we find that 
rather than undermine the self-employed enterprise base it actually boosts it.  We find 
that half-hearted IPR conventions, in this case the Phonograms Convention, designed to 
accommodate countries with a weak desire to support IPRS undermines this positive 
effect.  We do not find any evidence to suggest that the organizations which tend to be 
associated with the enforcement of IPR laws such as Interpol, ISO, PCA, UNCTAD, 
UNESCO, WIPO and the WTO had any effect over and above WIPO and the WTO 
helping to create TRIPS in the first place.   
 
The evidence in the paper indicates that the standard practice of international economic 
development aid where recipient countries have been encouraged to embrace democracy 
and IPRs (in particular, the TRIPS Agreement) seems to have been prudent.  Most likely 
these initiatives would act to boost the self-employed enterprise base in developing and 
transition economies.    
 
Keywords:  self-employment, intellectual property rights, law  
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1. Introduction 
Innovation and intellectual property rights are often heralded as key components 
underlying the entrepreneurial economy. Entrepreneurial organisations are predominantly 
characterised by the commercialisation of innovation but often are the source of the 
innovation too.  This process in large firms has been extensively analysed (See Martin 
2002 for an overview) and its roots date back to the work of Schumpeter (1942).   The 
ability of firms in this environment to recoup fixed costs relies on their ability to thwart 
imitation. Without some impediment to imitation innovators face unfair competition 
where imitators can free-ride on the R&D costs and risks undertaken by innovators.  
Thus, the existence and enforcement of intellectual property right (IPR) laws become 
important determinants of large firm innovative activity (see Arrow 1962, and Besen and 
Raskind 1991 for an overview of the economic motivation of IPR laws).  More recently, 
the innovation activity of smaller firms has been highlighted (for a perspective, see 
Audretsch 1995) as well as the role for venture capital backed organisations (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1999).  However, Bhide (2000) demonstrates that the vast bulk of new 
ventures are not very innovative.  This observation is supported by the data from the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Bosma and Harding 2006).  Bhide argues that most 
new ventures are mainly imitative with low growth prospects.  Thus, he labels these small 
firms as ‘marginal businesses’.  Studies such as Burke, Fitzroy and Nolan (2000) indicate 
that vast bulk of the self-employed (over 95%) would fit this category.  Whether or not 
the self-employed sector benefits or not from intellectual property right laws and culture 
has been a largely overlooked area of research.  Most likely because is too often assumed 
that imitation intensive firms are likely to be negatively affected by IPR laws intended to 
make imitation more difficult/costly.  The purpose of this paper is to investigate this 
neglected area of research. We investigate how mostly less innovative and more imitative 
self-employed entrepreneurial firms are affected by intellectual property right laws.   
Although most of the self-employed sector is comprised of marginal firms, at an 
aggregate level it is very significant - if not the most important (Audretsch and Thurik 
2004) – part of the entrepreneurial economy.  Furthermore, it as been argued in many 
quarters (e.g. Schmitz 1989, Schultz 1975, 1980) that on aggregate imitative activity is 
more important than innovative activity; particularly where it magnifies and speeds up 
the diffusion of new technologies in the economy.  Thus, it is remarkable that at present 
there has been very little empirical analysis investigating how the creation and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) affects this sector.   
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to shed some light on how the predominantly 
imitative self-employed sector has reacted to IPR creation, enforcement and culture.  The 
idea is that this study can then be used as means to flesh out in a more comprehensive 
fashion the wider impact of IPRs on the entrepreneurial economy.  Therefore, in this 
context our contribution is to focus on the neglected impact of IPRs on self-employment 
 3 
 
and we use international panel dataset in order to capture cross country and temporal 
changes in an IPR regime comprising the laws, institutions, economic activity and 
culture.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we discuss the 
theoretical framework and the data.  This is followed in section 3 by an outline of the 
econometric methodology and the results.  The concluding section of the paper draws out 
the implications of the findings of the paper. 
2. Theoretical framework and data 
We draw together the economics literature on self-employment with the law and 
economics literature relating to R&D and innovation.  We use the wage worker versus 
self-employment career choice model developed by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989).  The basic premise assumes that income is a major part of 
the utility functions of members of the workforce.  Therefore, the number of people who 
choose to become self-employed is a positive function of earnings from self-employment 
(∏) and a negative function of its opportunity cost, the wage rate (w). Net entrepreneurial 
income (y) is defined  
                                wy −∏=                               (1) 
y as an argument in individual’s utility function where an increase in y increases the 
likelihood that an individual will choose to become self-employed rather than take up 
wage work.  We define y as being comprised of the sum of each self-employed venture’s 
profit function plus the wages paid by the self-employed individual to herself.  
Intellectual property rights law, institutions and culture can play an important role in 
defining the profit function and within that, the impact of entrepreneurial ability.  Since 
intellectual capital can form both an input and an output of the business it can enter both 
the revenue and the cost functions.  Hence its impact on self-employed income is often 
ambiguous.    If one takes the view that IPR laws act to restrict access to technology for 
imitative firms then one should expect the negative effect to dominate.  If alternatively 
one expects that IPRs will create new profit opportunities for new ventures by creating 
new opportunities which can be imitated and which are best exploited by new small firms 
then they may be expected to have a positive effect.  What we are saying in fact is that 
the conditions which define whether or not IPRs are beneficial to economic welfare are 
the same in terms of those assessing the net impact on self-employments rates.   
The law and economics literature distinguishes between the dual effect of IPRs on 
welfare, namely their impact on an incentive for firms to innovate versus what Landes 
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(2003) describes as consumer access to and Cornish (1999) describes as dissemination of 
creative works to consumers.  In the case of self-employment profit functions the key is 
knowing whether the marginal effect of IPRs on the knowledge stock (through increased 
innovation ) from which the self-employed may imitate is greater than their marginal 
effect on restricting access to this knowledge stock by increasing the monopoly power of 
innovators.  Thus, in terms of the paper we seek to assess which effect dominates but we 
also attempt to ascertain whether the effect is uniform across every aspect of the entire 
IPR regime such as the laws, institutions, culture etc or whether its affect may vary.     
We now describe the variables used in the analysis and explain how they might be 
expected to influence the rate of self-employment.  The data is drawn from three sources 
comprising the World Bank’s ‘World Economic Indicators’ (WEI), the International 
Labour Organization’s ‘Key Indicators of the Labour Market’ (ILO), and the 
International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI).  A list of the countries used in 
the analysis is presented in Appendix 1.  The list of variables along with their means and 
standard errors are presented in the Appendix 2.  
Research such as Burke, FitzRoy and Nolan (2002) indicates that the specification of the 
determinants of male and female self-employment levels can be radically different and 
therefore, we opt for two separate equations for males and females rather than an 
aggregate equation using a gender dummy variable.  Our main purpose is to capture the 
impact of the existence of the IPR regime/culture on both male and female self-
employment rates.  We now describe the general specification used in each equation.  We 
initially discuss the IPR related variables which are central to the motivation of the paper.  
We then move on to discuss control variables drawn from the small business economics 
literature and which relate to the main economic factors that determine the rate of self-
employment.  We consider a range of represented by the vector x that have an impact on 
net self-employed income y(x).  From equation 1 arguments which have a positive 
(negative) effect on y increase (reduce) the utility from self-employment and will hence 
raise (reduce) the self-employment rate.  We discuss legal factors first because they are 
the core focus of the paper and then move on to discuss the remaining elements of the 
vector x. 
Legal factors 
We aim to attempt to test for the effect of a very wide range of means through which the 
IPR regime may affect self-employment rates.  Thus we consider the following:  
IPR laws:  since all the countries in the sample have IPR laws we test to see the extent to 
which these conform to particular norms and styles.  We do this by assessing the impact 
of membership of key international IPR conventions.  In order to join these international 
conventions the national laws must conform to the style, objectives and principles 
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underlying them.  In addition it might also indicate a level of some political support for 
these objectives. We test the impact of 4 IPR related international 
agreements/conventions.  Two of these relate to IPRs in general and the other two are 
specific to the music industry.  In all four cases, we use a discrete (1,0) variable and also 
a variable testing for the duration of membership, conscious of the fact that it might take 
time for these conventions to make an impact.  Therefore, we include variables which 
capture the length of time in which a country has been a member of the Berne 
Convention and TRIPS Agreement respectively in order to test the impact of general 
conventions - that aim to have implications for the economy as a whole rather than being 
specific to a particular industry.   
The Berne Convention is the oldest and most fundamental general convention on 
intellectual property rights.  It sets out statutes and principles which have become the 
core underlying standards for most types of IPR law. In contrast the TRIPS agreement is 
a much more specific convention which attempts to build upon Berne in order to cater for 
a more complex business and technological environment in an ever increasing global and 
developing World economy.  We constructed these variables from IFPI data and 
information from the World Trade Organization.   
We also have similar variables for membership of the Rome and Geneva conventions for 
industry specific laws with a view to see if see if moves to create an IPR conducive 
culture in one industry – in this case, the music industry – have spillover effects on the 
self-employed economy more generally and/or in fact capture a general political will to 
legislate more robust/strong forms of IPR laws.  The 1960 Rome Convention was a very 
specific and binding agreement which dealt with IPR issues surrounding the manufacture, 
distribution and sale of pre-recorded music.  The specificity of the Convention 
discouraged many countries form signing up.  As a result, ten years later the music 
industry produced a much less specific and committal convention to deal with similar 
areas covered by the Rome Convention.  This new convention became known as the 
Phonograms Convention.  The two conventions provide us with an opportunity to not 
only test if spillover effects from a single industry to an economy exist but also to see 
whether such spillover effects flow more or less easily when the convention is more 
general in its legal from.  Alternatively, to see whether a high commitment to support 
IPRs (e.g. the Rome Convention) acts as a positive stimulus to IPR related performance 
in the rest of the economy and likewise whether a weak IPR convention (such as 
Phonograms) acts to undermine IPR based economic activity.  Tables 1 and 2 contain 
correlation matrices for these conventions and self-employment rates.  It is evident that 
there is significant variation in the membership durations across the panel of countries 
and little correlation with male and female self employment rates.   
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Male Self-employment Rates and Duration in IPR 
Conventions 
 
 Self-Employment TRIPS Rome Geneva Berne 
Self-Employment 1.00     
TRIPS 0.00 1.00    
Rome -0.31 0.10 1.00   
Geneva -0.41 0.26 0.52 1.00  
Berne 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.41 1.00 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Female Self-employment Rates and Duration in IPR 
Conventions 
 
 Self-Employment TRIPS Rome Geneva Berne 
Self-Employment 1.00     
TRIPS -0.04 1.00    
Rome -0.36 0.10 1.00   
Geneva -0.27 0.26 0.52 1.00  
Berne 0.12 0.00 0.52 0.41 1.00 
 
The legal and political system/culture.  Here we want to account for the legal and 
political cultural context in which IPR laws exist in order to see if these have an impact 
on the effect of IPR laws on self-employment rates.  We include a set of dummy 
variables which define whether the legal code in each country is based on civil, common, 
Islamic or transition economy law (WEI data).  It is not clear what effect these legal 
systems may have.  On the one hand, common and civil law countries were the 
originators of IPR laws and hence may be expected to be the most conducive to IPR 
related economic activity. However, Baumol (1990) has also raised the prospect that legal 
systems which are conducive to a litigation culture can be detrimental for enterprise in 
that they can inspire destructive economic activity based around a rent seeking style 
motivation.  Thus, a priori the impact of these legal systems on self-employment is 
ambiguous.  We also include a set of dummy variables which define the political system 
including a republic, monarchy, communist and dictatorship (WEI data). 
Legal institutions.  We investigate the importance of legal institutions either directly or 
indirectly relevant for the creation and enforcement of IPR laws.  Thus, we include a set 
of variables which define whether or not a country is a member of the International 
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
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Organization (UNESCO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  All the data is taken from the World Bank’s WEI 
database.  In general, we would expect membership to be associated with a more 
prevalent culture of respect for intellectual property.  
Respect for Intellectual property.  In order to capture the extent to which IPR laws are 
respected we include a variable which measures the proportion of the CD music album 
market that is accounted for pirate produce.  Since the CD music albums are widely 
popular consumer product we feel that this gives a reasonable estimation of how much 
intellectual property in a key product is respected.  This data is provided by the 
International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI).   
Level of Patent activity.  Patents are often used as a gauge of innovative activity.  But 
since not all innovations which can be patented are actually patented they also contain a 
measure of the extent to which innovation is controlled monopolistically.  Thus, patents 
can act to either boost or retard self-employed entrepreneurship.  On one hand the 
availability of new technology creates new profit opportunities which can be exploited by 
self-employed entrepreneurs.  Alternatively, if key technology becomes monopolistically 
controlled due to the IPR protection then it may act to make market entry more difficult.  
A third effect may result from a role model or demonstration effect where high levels of 
patent registrations demonstrate new possibilities for business venturing and may indeed 
inspire others to follow by example.  In order to avoid endogeneity problems we do not 
use patents registered by residents as a variable as many of these will have been filed by 
self-employed entrepreneurs.  Instead, in order to get an exogenous measure of the level 
of patent IPR innovative activity, we use the number of patents registered by foreign 
nationals (WEI). 
IPR related consumer and media products:  Here we assess whether a high usage of IPR 
intensive products act to increase awareness and support for IPR and in turn affect self-
employed entrepreneurship.  We also consider that many of these media related products 
are transmitters of information and therefore may increase the knowledge base and 
promote self-employed entrepreneurship.  Thus we include variables which measure the 
number of personal computers (WEI) , TV (WEI), cable television (WEI), CD music 
albums (IFPI), mobile phones (WEI), internet (WEI), and daily newspapers sold (WEI) in 
each country.   
Control variables from the economics of self-employment. 
Wage rate: we include the wage rate (ILO) to account for the opportunity cost of self-
employment and hence expect a negative sign.   
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Unemployment.  We know that higher levels of unemployment can result in a lower 
probability that an individual can secure wage work and hence can push individuals into 
self-employment.  Thus, we include a measure of the unemployment rate (ILO) in order 
to account for the likely positive effect between unemployment and self-employment 
rates. 
Cost of capital: we use the interest rate (WEI) to account for the costs of capital which 
would be expected to have a negative affect on self-employment rates. 
Composition of National Income: we use percentage of labour force in manufacturing, 
services and agriculture to account for some of the diversity in the economic composition 
of GDP (WEI).  In developed countries higher levels of self-employment tend to be 
associated with a higher proportion of GDP accounted for by the service sector which 
tends to have lower minimum efficient scale.  By contrast, less developed countries with 
small scale farming may also have higher levels of self-employment.  We also include 
information technology as a percentage of GDP to capture the recent growth in hi-tech 
self-employment ventures.  
Education:  Higher levels of education may raise entrepreneurial ability and enhance the 
rates of self-employment.  However, the same increase in human capital is likely to 
increase labour productivity and hence the wage rate thereby raising the possibility that it 
may reduce self-employment.  Due to data limitations and variations in economic 
development across the sample of countries, we use pupils in primary education as a 
percentage of the population as an independent variable.  Thus, this education measure 
only captures the impact of early school education. 
Age of population: it is now well documented that the propensity of individuals to choose 
to become self-employed varies by age group (see Storey, 1994 for an overview).  It is 
also the case that profit opportunities vary by age group due to differences in the age 
composition of consumer demographics.  Data limitations resulting from our panel of 
countries prevent us from testing the impact of anything other than the size of the work 
age population (15-64), children (0-14) and the elderly (64+).   
Life expectancy at birth: if self employment involves a level of start-up investment for a 
future stream of income from a particular venture then the longer the life of the individual 
the greater the value of present discounted value of future free cash flows (FCFs).  Thus, 
since wage work lacks start-up investment it follows that the longer the life expectancy of 
the individual the more likely she may find that self-employment is the more optimal 
career choice.  In order to capture this effect we use life expectancy at birth across the 
panel of countries as an independent variable. 
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We have surveyed the elements of the vector x that have an impact on net self-employed 
income y(x).  In the next section, we test their impact on the rate of self employment 
S(y(x)) across the countries in the sample.  The self-employment literature (for surveys, 
see Storey 1994 and Parker 2004) has shown that S’(y) > 0 so the sign on y’(x) can be 
gleaned from estimation of S’(x) which we test in the next section.  In other words, since  
x
y
y
S
x
S
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
                            (2) 
it follows that since S’(y) is < 0 then S’(x) > 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
y’(x) > 0.  The same correspondence applies to S’(x) > 0 and S’(x) = 0 and y’(x) > 0 and 
y’(x) = 0 respectively.  Thus, the estimates in the next section allow us to assess the 
impact of the vector x (in our case mainly comprised IPR related variables) on self-
employed income in a similar fashion to that used in Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998).   
3. Econometric Model and Results 
The following model is used to estimate the impacts of IPR laws and western culture on 
international self-employment rates: 
itiitit uxS εβ ++′=                            (3) 
where: x is a column vector of IPR and other independent variables outlined in the 
previous section, iu represents time invariant, country-specific, unobservables; and itε is 
an iid disturbance term.  The assumption that iu is stochastic gives rise to the random 
effects model; fixed effects arise where iu is non-random. 
The random effects estimator is known to be consistent and efficient under the 
assumption ( ) 0,cov =iit ux .  In contrast, under the same assumption, the fixed effects 
estimator is consistent but inefficient.  Accordingly, in the following estimation, we 
prefer the random effects GLS estimator on grounds of efficiency. 1  
However, GLS is inconsistent if ( ) 0,cov ≠iit ux , whereas the fixed effects estimator 
retains its consistency in these circumstances.  Therefore, we test for systematic 
                                                 
1  Also, inferences in the fixed effects model are conditional on the sample, which is not the case for the 
random effects model.  Conditional inferences would limit the interpretation of the estimates to the 
countries present in the sample. 
 10 
 
differences between the GLS and fixed effects estimates using a Hausman test.  The idea 
underlying this test is that, if ( ) 0,cov =iit ux , both sets of estimates should not differ 
systematically since both are consistent.  In contrast, if ( ) 0,cov ≠iit ux , then the estimates 
will differ systematically and the inference is that the random effects model is 
misspecified.  In addition, Wald tests for omitted, time-varying, variables are conducted 
since both GLS and fixed effects estimators are inconsistent if ( ) 0,cov ≠ititx ε . 
Estimation Results 
Separate GLS estimations of the self-employment equations, for both males and females, 
are reported in the following table.  The estimation sample covers the period 1995-20002 
and the 32 countries listed in Appendix 1.  A table of summary statistics, for the variables 
used in the analysis, is reported in Appendix 2. 
Table 3: The Impact of IPR Laws and Culture on Self-Employment Rates.  Random 
Effects GLS Regression 
 Males Females 
 Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
     
IPR RELATED VARIABLES:     
     
Patent Activity     
Non-resident patent registrations (1000s) -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.08 
     
IPR Related Goods (per 1000 of population)     
Computers  -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Cable TV  -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
TV  -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.12 
Internet  0.00 0.37 0.00 0.13 
(joint significance)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
     
Membership of Conventions (duration; 
 years)     
TRIPS 0.79 0.00 0.29 0.14 
Rome 0.27 0.01 0.13 0.05 
Phonograms -0.35 0.00 -0.32 0.00 
                                                 
2 The self-employment data, in fact, cover a longer time span.  However, the estimation sample is 
constrained by the span of patent registrations data (1995-2000).  We estimated models, with longer 
sample periods, by omitting the patents data, but these models failed the misspecification tests. 
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(joint significance)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
     
Political system     
Republic 2.98 0.19 7.26 0.81 
Constitutional monarchy -  4.11 0.89 
Other democracy 6.83 0.01 11.27 0.71 
(joint significance)  (0.03)  (0.00) 
     
Legal system     
Civil law -1.83 0.46 -3.36 0.05 
Common law -5.84 0.01 -3.81 0.03 
(joint significance)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
     
CONTROL VARIABLES:     
     
Log GDP per capita 3.99 0.03 3.45 0.01 
Unemployment rate (% of total workforce) 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.01 
Log real wage 1 -0.73 0.01 -0.76 0.00 
Pupils in Primary Education 
(% of population) 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.15 
Life expectancy (Years)2 -0.01 0.97 -0.17 0.61 
Real interest rates -  -0.02 0.63 
IT expenditure (% of GDP) 0.34 0.02 0.29 0.03 
English 4.83 0.02 -3.15 0.05 
International Trade (% of GDP) 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.83 
     
Population (millions)
3     
Aged 14 or less -0.78 0.26 -0.50 0.35 
Aged 15-64 0.40 0.18 0.34 0.09 
Aged 65 or more -0.50 0.48 -0.59 0.15 
(joint significance)  (0.35)  (0.17) 
     
Employment (% of total)
4 
    
Agriculture 0.41 0.04 0.26 0.21 
Industry -0.38 0.04 -0.38 0.11 
Services -0.08 0.62 -0.11 0.59 
(joint significance)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
     
2
uσ  3.56 
 
2.16 
 12 
 
2
εσ  0.58 
 
0.46 
   
R squared ( )( )2, itit yxcorr β′  0.87 
 
0.81 
2χ  (p-value) 0.00 
 
0.00 
Hausman Specification Test (p-value)5 0.64 0.91 
Wald test (omitted variables) (p-value)6, 7 0.11 0.07 
Notes: 
1. This variable is instrumented using its first lag. 
2. Gender specific measures used. 
3. Gender specific measures used. 
4. Gender specific measures used. 
5. Hausman test for systematic differences between fixed and random effects coefficients. 
6. The omitted variables are: domestic music repertoire as a percentage of music sales; music piracy as a 
percentage of the legitimate market; patent registrations by residents; lagged patent registrations by non-
residents; mobile phones per 1000 of population; and interest rates (males only). 
7. Additional tests for omitted quadratic terms, in the treaty duration variables, yielded p-values of 0.69 and 
0.11 for the male and female models respectively.  
We begin by discussing the IPR related variables.  In terms patent activity, we observe 
that non-resident patent registrations are weakly negatively related to female self-
employment rates; an extra 10,000 of these registrations lowers this self-employment by 
0.1 percentage points.  The corresponding effect for males is of the same magnitude but 
is, apparently, statistically insignificant.3  The results appear to indicate that either the 
access versus creativity effects of patents cancel each other out for male self-employment 
whereas the restrictive access factor (a barrier to entry) marginally dominates for female 
self-employment. 
Higher levels of IPR related media goods, principally computers and subscriptions to 
cable television, appear to retard both male and female self-employment levels.  Thus, we 
don’t find any evidence to support the notion that familiarity with IPR related goods 
(themselves facilitated by a conducive IPR regime) acts to inspire self-employment.  If 
anything, the negative effect seems to indicate that IPR related media dampens or deters 
the self-employment entrepreneurial spirit. 
Memberships of all the IPR conventions apart from the Berne Convention are significant 
for both males and females.  Dummy variable for all the conventions were insignificant 
while duration variables were significant.  This suggests that it is not merely the 
membership of a convention that is important but having a length of time for a 
                                                 
3  However, we retain non-resident patent registrations, in both models, since omitting this variable lead to 
failure of the Hausman specification tests and Wald tests for omitted variables. 
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convention to make an impact.  Additional years of membership, in the TRIPS 
Agreement and Rome Convention, increase self-employment rates, whereas the marginal 
impact of the Geneva Phonograms Convention is negative.  There is a substantial 
difference in the total marginal impacts4 of IPR conventions across gender.  For a 
country, which is a member of all three treaties, an additional year of membership 
increases male self-employment by 0.7 percentage points, whereas the impact for females 
is only 0.1 percentage points.5  Thus, given that membership of Berne is a prerequisite to 
be a signature of TRIPS, these results appear to indicate that the Berne Convention has 
been superseded in importance by the more recent TRIPS Agreement.  Moreover, that a 
commitment to international IPR laws has a positive impact on self-employment rates.  
This finding is important – especially for emerging and transition economies - 
considering that IPR laws are often seen as barrier to the development of a self-
employment entrepreneurial base.   
The significance of the Rome and Phonograms conventions supports the notion that the 
impact of an IPR regime in one industry can spill over to the self-employed economy 
more widely.  Alternatively, they may reflect the impact of having strong political 
initiatives to support IPRs.  The signs are opposite to one another and again seem to 
indicate that a stronger commitment to IPR law seems to have a positive impact on self-
employment with a positive spill over effect emanating from the strong-IPR Rome 
Convention and a negative effect resulting from the weaker-IPR Phonograms 
Convention.  
The country’s political system affects both male and female self-employment rates; these 
estimates suggest that democratic forms of government promote self-employment. 6  This 
suggests that liberal democracies and self-employment present a conducive environment 
for self-employment.  Freedom of expression associated with democracies, facilitates 
creative thought and its dissemination so this political environment is likely to be 
conducive to innovation.  By contrast, a common law system is, for both males and 
females, associated with lower self-employment rates relative to other types of legal 
system.7  The civil law country coefficient is also negative but insignificant.  Given that 
this result controls for democracies we view this as perhaps an indication that that 
                                                 
4  That is, the sum of the marginal impacts of membership over the 3 conventions. 
5 The average impact of TRIPS membership on male self-employment is 1.9 percentage points (i.e. the 
marginal impact, 0.8, multiplied by the average duration in TRIPS, 2.4 years); this impact is 0.7 points 
for females.  Similarly: the average impact of Rome membership is 2.7 percentage points for males and 
1.3 percentage points for females; and the average impact of Geneva membership is minus 4.5 
percentage points for males and minus 4.1 points for females.  This implies a total average impact, on 
male self-employment, of (plus) 0.1 percentage points (for a country which is a signatory to all 3 
conventions). In contrast, this impact is minus 2.1 points for females. 
6  The omitted political systems are: communism; dictatorship; and transitional governments. 
7  The omitted categories are Islamic and transitional legal systems. 
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common law systems are conducive to rent seeking litigation as discussed by Baumol 
(1990) which would deter productive enterprise activity in the self-employment sector.  
The monopoly power in IPRs has a longer of tradition of support in civil and common 
law counties and hence these negative effects may in fact be emanating from the impact 
of this on the small firm self-employed sector. 
It is interesting to note that the legal institution and consumer culture of respect for IPR 
variables are all insignificant and did not survive the general to specific estimation.  Thus, 
the extensive actions and resources employed by organizations such as Interpol, ISO, 
PCA, UNCTAD, UNESCO, WIPO and the WTO appear to have no marginal effect on 
the self-employment rates.  Of course, to the extent that the WTO and WIPO played a 
major role in developing TRIPS these organizations are somewhat exonerated.  Likewise, 
it appears that a lack of respect for IPRs which is a concomitant part of higher levels of 
music piracy has no impact on self-employment rates.     
Among the control variables, higher levels of GDP, reflecting enhanced business 
opportunities, are related to higher self-employment rates.  There is also a significant 
push effect from unemployment; a one percentage point increase in unemployment raises 
self-employment by 0.26 points, among males, and by 0.2 points among females.  Wage 
earnings have, as expected, a negative effect on self-employment rates.  However, these 
effects are quite small, with a 10% increase in wages reducing self-employment by less 
than 0.1 percentage points, in both the male and female equations.   
Regarding human capital, higher levels of primary education raise male self-employment 
but have no significant effect on female self-employment.  We note the impact of the use 
of the English language has a positive effect for male self-employment but a negative 
effect on female self-employment.  In contrast, the marginal effect of information 
technology expenditure, as a proportion of GDP, is about one-third of a percentage point 
across both males and females.  Finally, employment shares by sector have significant 
impacts for males and females; in particular, self-employment rates are higher in rural 
economies, and lower in industrialized countries. 
The results of the Hausman tests indicate that, for both models, we do not reject the 
hypothesis that the random effects are uncorrelated with the regressors.  This suggests the 
random effects models are not misspecified.  In addition, the Wald tests, for omitted 
time-varying variables, provide further evidence that the models are adequately specified.  
Additional tests of parameter constancy, between high income and lower income 
countries, were unable to reject the hypothesis that the models are stable over income 
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groups. 8  This is important because it indicates that the results hold regardless of the 
stage of economic development. 
Table 4: Self-employment rates in IPR and counterfactual regimes 
 IPR Regime Counterfactual 
Regime 
Impact=IPR Regime – Counterfactual 
Regime (p-value) 
    
Males (1a) 23.17% (1b) 17.68% 5.49 points (0.00) 
 (2a) 18.23% (2b) 17.68% 0.55 points (0.20) 
 (3a) 22.49% (3b) 14.02% 8.47 points (0.00) 
 (4a) 18.35% (4b) 18.16% 0.19 points (0.38) 
    
Females (1a) 13.49% (1b) 11.94% 1.56 points (0.00) 
 (2a) 13.03% (2b) 11.94% 1.11 points (0.01) 
 (3a) 14.09% (3b) 7.74% 6.35 points (0.00) 
 (4a) 9.79% (4b) 12.04% -2.25 points (0.00) 
 
In table 4 we have computed the impact of some IPR/counterfactual regimes on self-
employment rates in order to gauge the magnitude of some of the results discussed so far.  
We provide estimates for the following comparison groups (all other variables, not 
mentioned explicitly in the above regimes, are held constant at their sample mean 
values):     
(1a)  Civil law legal system; other democratic political system; member of 
TRIPS, Rome and Phonograms conventions. 
(1b)  Neither civil nor common law legal system; non-democratic political 
system; not a member of TRIPS, Rome or Phonograms conventions. 
(2a)  Common law legal system; other democratic political system; member of 
TRIPS, Rome and Phonograms conventions. 
(2b)=(1b) 
(3a)  Member of TRIPS and Rome. 
(3b)  Non-member of TRIPS and Rome. 
(4a)  Member of TRIPS, Rome and Phonograms. 
                                                 
8  The models were re-estimated on the sub-samples of high income countries i.e., countries with an income 
per head of $9,386 or more (following World Bank income groupings).  The sample countries with 
incomes below this threshold (lower income countries) are: Romania, Thailand, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey.  Chow’s predictive failure tests were computed by 
comparing the residual sums of squares, from the pooled models, with those obtained from the high 
income sub-samples.  The p-values for the predictive failure tests are 0.57 and 0.82, for the male and 
female models respectively, indicating that the models are stable over income groups. 
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(4b) Non-member of TRIPS, Rome and Phonograms. 
Counterfactuals 1 and 2 show that countries with IPR regimes with wide convention 
membership which is underpinned by common or civil legal systems as well as 
democratic political systems have significantly higher rates of self-employment than 
other types of countries.  Comparison 3 hones in on the unique role of IPR conventions, 
namely the wide encompassing and modern TRIPS Agreement alongside the 
specific/rigorous Rome Convention.  The impact of these conventions is dramatic raising 
self-employment rates for males and females by 8.5 and 6.5 percentage points 
respectively.  These are equivalent to a 60% increase in the rate of male self-employment 
and an 82% increase in the female equivalent.  Adding in membership to the Phonograms 
Convention – a convention created to entice countries with a weak commitment to IPRS 
to sign up – to counterfactual 3 yields counterfactual 4.  It is noteworthy that this causes 
the effect of this group of IPR conventions on male self-employment to become 
insignificant and in fact reduces female self-employment.  Thus, counterfactual 4 
indicates that IPR conventions created to accommodate ‘weak’ or ‘half-hearted’ support 
for IPRS can undermine the positive effects of more robust conventions such as TRIPS 
and Rome.   
4. Conclusion 
The paper sets out to test the impact of IPR laws, institutions and culture on the least 
innovative segment of the entrepreneurial economy, namely the self-employed.  While 
there are highly innovative firms within this segment the vast bulk are mainly imitation 
intensive firms (as reflected in Global Entrepreneurship Monitor statistics). They are 
what Bhide (2000) describes as ‘marginal’ firms both in terms of their level their 
economic performance and degree of innovativeness.  However, analyses such as 
Audretsch and Thurik (2004) have shown that despite this feature the self-employed 
sector provide and important bedrock to the entrepreneurial economy more widely.  
Therefore, it is important to know how the level of self-employment is affected by the 
IPR regime.  This is especially the case because unlike R&D oriented large firms who are 
predominantly net producers of intellectual capital, most self-employed ventures are 
small imitative net users of innovation who may well be expected to suffer from a vibrant 
IPR regime.   
The paper draws on the dual impact of IPRs on economic welfare emphasized in the law 
and economics literature.  This highlights that IPRs tend to have both a positive 
innovation creation and a negative innovation access effects.  In terms of the small 
business economics literature too these would be expected to have similar effects 
(through the profit function) on the mainly imitative self-employed sector.  The paper sets 
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out to estimate the net effect of these conflicting impacts through the various elements 
that comprise an IPR regime including the political system, the laws, and institutions as 
well as a general familiarity with and respect for IPR related products.  Cumulatively, the 
analysis indicates that a well developed IPR regime has a net positive effect on the self-
employed sector.  Since the self-employed sector is possibly the only segment of the 
enterprise base where IPRs may be expected to have a negative effect it provides a useful 
contribution to our empirical understanding of the effects of IPRs on the entrepreneurial 
economy more widely. 
In arriving at this conclusion we first control for non IPR related influences on the self-
employed sector.  In so doing, we find that self-employment appears to be negatively 
related to the wage rate and cost of capital and is influenced by an unemployment push 
effect.  Primary education has a positive effect on male self-employment as does the 
English language.  The extent to which the economy has a high percentage of GDP 
accounted for by the technology sector and agriculture are also positive influences.  In the 
same fashion an open economy also tends to be associated with higher levels of self-
employment indicating that the infant industry argument does not appear to hold in terms 
of the self-employed enterprise sector.  We also find some tentative evidence for the 
existence of Baumol’s (1990) destructive enterprise theory as it relates to common (and 
perhaps civil) law countries in that these legal systems seem to cause a reduction in self-
employment.  We also observe that high consumption of media related products such as 
computers, TV and cable TV (which we initially included in order to test for IPR related 
product role model and knowledge access effects) having a negative effect on self-
employed enterprise activity.  We think this is possibly because they may cause an 
increased preference for leisure over enterprise activity.   
The main result of the paper that a more developed IPR regime is beneficial for the self-
employed enterprise sector is not common across all the elements that comprise an IPR 
regime.  The result is mainly driven by a positive effect of international IPR conventions 
and agreements.  Contrary to some of the most vocal objections to the TRIPS Agreement 
we find that rather than undermine the self-employed enterprise base it actually boosts it.  
We find that half-hearted IPR conventions, in the case the Phonograms Convention, 
designed to accommodate countries with a weak desire to support IPRS undermines this 
positive effect.  We did not find any evidence to suggest that the organizations which 
tend to be associated with the enforcement of IPR laws such as Interpol, ISO, PCA, 
UNCTAD, UNESCO, WIPO and the WTO had any effect over and above WIPO and the 
WTO helping to create TRIPS in the first place.  We also found that democracies boost 
self-employment rates which is what one would expect in terms of the political 
conditions necessary to promote free enterprise thought and expression.  Turning to the 
actual use of some of these laws, we do find that patent registrations by foreigners reduce 
self-employment which is likely to reflect a limitation of access to innovation for the self-
employed sector.  However, we do not find that a lack of access to copyright IPRs has the 
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same effect when testing the impact of consumer purchases of pirate CDs on self-
employment.   
Thus, in general we find that the most fundamental tenets of IPR laws, namely the 
existence of the laws themselves, their specificity and strength, and a democratic society 
in which to accommodate them are three very positive drivers of self-employment.  This 
indicates that in terms of enterprise policy in developing economies an emphasis on 
political economy aspects are very important.  Indeed the evidence in the paper indicates 
that the medium standing practice of international economic development aid where 
recipient countries have been encouraged to embrace democracy and IPRs (in particular, 
the TRIPS) seems to have been prudent.  Most likely these initiatives would have acted to 
boost the self-employed enterprise base in developing and transition economies.    
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Appendix 1: Sample Countries 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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Appendix: Summary Statistics 
 
 Males/All Females 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
         
Self-Employment (%) 18.11 7.31 8.30 42.20 9.62 4.83 3.40 25.50 
         
GDP per capita  
(1995 US Dollars) 21,063 12,074 1,297 44,775     
Unemployment rate (% of total workforce) 7.47 3.54 0.9 22     
Real wage  
(1995 US Dollars) 17.94 60.12 0.00 301.35     
Pupils in Primary Education 
(% of population) 0.38 0.07 0.27 0.59     
Non-resident patent registrations (1000s) 75,341 44,259 5,205 199,565     
Life expectancy (Years) 73.01 3.28 65.20 77.70 79.70 2.35 70.40 84.60 
English 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00     
IT expenditure (% of GDP) 6.20 2.05 1.00 13.60     
Trade (% of GDP) 84.75 57.38 18.44 329.19     
         
Membership of Conventions (duration; 
 years)         
Trips 2.41 1.43 0.00 5.00     
Rome 9.98 11.95 0.00 36.00     
Geneva 12.87 10.48 0.00 27.00     
         
IPR Related Goods (per 1000 of population)         
Computers  219.26 131.82 15.48 572.10     
Cable TV  132.68 102.71 0.81 380.71     
TV  513.28 148.65 225.58 891.81     
Internet  111.48 115.86 2.21 489.87     
         
Political system         
Republic 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00     
Constitutional monarchy 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00     
Other democracy 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00     
         
Legal system         
Civil law 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00     
Common law 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00     
         
Population (millions)         
Aged 14 or less 3.92 6.59 0.03 30.80 3.84 64.90 0.03 29.40 
Aged 15-64 13.50 20.50 0.09 92.40 13.90 21.30 0.09 94.00 
Aged 65 or more 2.25 3.42 0.01 14.90 3.46 5.07 0.02 20.90 
         
Employment (% of total)4         
Agriculture 8.76 8.48 0.30 49.40 5.37 6.74 0.10 51.50 
Industry 38.44 6.02 22.10 50.30 18.04 6.32 9.30 32.20 
Services 52.60 9.37 28.50 66.80 76.33 10.11 31.70 88.40 
 
Note: In cases where the variable is gender specific, the summary statistics are reported for both male and female sub-samples. 
